Pakistan’s Afghan Policy at a Crossroads

Sher Ahmed Durrani

Islamabad: For decades, Pakistan’s western frontier has been viewed through a singular strategic lens: the pursuit of “strategic depth” in Afghanistan.

Conceived during the Cold War and refined in the shadow of rivalry with India, this doctrine presumed that a friendly, or pliant, Afghanistan would provide Pakistan with geopolitical space, security leverage, and insulation against external threats.

Yet the recurring clashes along the Durand Line suggest a starkly different reality: what was once imagined as strategic depth has become a persistent strategic liability.

Recent tensions at border crossings such as Chaman and Torkham are not episodic aberrations; they are symptoms of a deeper structural malaise. The Afghan state, whether under republican leadership or the Taliban, has consistently resisted external influence, particularly when it touches upon questions of sovereignty and territorial legitimacy.

The Durand Line, never formally recognized by successive Afghan regimes, remains both a geopolitical fault line and a psychological barrier.

The persistence of border clashes reflects not merely tactical disagreements but a fundamental misreading of Afghanistan’s political sociology.

Afghan nationalism, historically decentralized yet fiercely independent, has proven resistant to external manipulation.

Pakistan’s security establishment, in seeking influence through non-state actors and ideological alignment, underestimated the long-term consequences of such engagement. The result has been a classic case of strategic blowback.

The rise of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan is perhaps the most glaring manifestation of this policy failure. Once considered an instrument of regional leverage, militancy has mutated into an existential internal threat.

Cross-border sanctuaries, porous boundaries, and competing interpretations of jihad have created a security environment in which distinctions between “good” and “bad” militants have collapsed entirely.

From a theoretical standpoint, this dynamic is well explained by Regional Security Complex Theory. The theory posits that security interdependence is geographically clustered: the insecurity of one state inevitably spills over into its neighbors.

Pakistan and Afghanistan exemplify this condition. Instability in Kabul reverberates in Peshawar; militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa finds echoes across the border.

In such a tightly coupled security environment, attempts at unilateral advantage are self-defeating.

Moreover, the pursuit of strategic depth has complicated Pakistan’s relations with extra-regional actors. The United States, once a strategic partner during the Afghan jihad and the post-9/11 era, has grown increasingly wary of Pakistan’s dual-track policies.

Similarly, regional powers such as Iran and Russia view instability along the Afghan frontier as a shared threat, not a strategic opportunity. In this context, Pakistan’s Afghan policy has not only failed to deliver security but has also contributed to diplomatic isolation.

The economic dimension is equally sobering. Persistent instability undermines Pakistan’s aspirations for regional connectivity, including transit trade with Central Asia and flagship initiatives such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Trade routes cannot flourish in conflict zones; pipelines and railways require predictability, not proxy warfare. By privileging geopolitical competition over economic cooperation, Pakistan has inadvertently constrained its own development trajectory.

It is therefore imperative to reconsider the foundational assumptions of Pakistan’s Afghan policy. The notion that Afghanistan can serve as a strategic hinterland is not only outdated but counterproductive.

Afghanistan is not a buffer to be managed; it is a sovereign state whose stability is intrinsically linked to Pakistan’s own security.

This recalibration will require difficult choices. A more conciliatory approach toward Afghanistan may necessitate tolerating a degree of Indian economic presence there, an outcome long resisted by Islamabad.

Yet the alternative, continued hostility, border closures, and militant spillover, is far more costly. Strategic maturity lies not in the exclusion of rivals at all costs, but in the prioritization of national stability over zero-sum competition.

Equally important is the need to shift from a security-centric paradigm to one grounded in economic interdependence. Cross-border trade, infrastructure development, and people-to-people exchanges offer more sustainable pathways to stability than coercive leverage.

A peaceful Afghanistan is not merely desirable; it is indispensable for Pakistan’s long-term prosperity.

At its core, the failure of strategic depth is a failure of imagination. It reflects an inability to move beyond the binaries of control and competition toward a more nuanced understanding of regional interdependence.

The lesson of the past four decades is unequivocal: influence without legitimacy breeds resistance, and proximity without trust breeds conflict.

Pakistan stands at a critical juncture. It can either persist with a doctrine that has repeatedly undermined its own security, or it can embrace a more pragmatic, cooperative approach to its western neighbor.

The choice should not be difficult. In the calculus of modern geopolitics, stability, not depth, is the true measure of strategic success.

Sher Ahmed Durrani is a senior lecturer in Political Science at the University of Loralai, Pakistan, and a PhD candidate at Quaid-i-Azam University. His research focuses on socio-political systems and sustainable development in South Asia. He can be reached at sherahmed.durrani@gmail.com.

The article is the writer’s opinion, it may or may not adhere to the organization’s editorial policy.

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