Taiwan Strait: Between War and Peace

Aliya Ghafoor

Islamabad: The Taiwan Strait has increasingly emerged as one of the most sensitive flashpoints in international politics, where military deterrence, strategic competition and the risk of escalation intersect.

The tensions surrounding Taiwan are no longer confined to the relationship between Beijing and Taipei. They have become closely linked to the strategic interests of the United States, Japan and other Indo-Pacific countries, while carrying potentially significant consequences for global trade and technology.

At the end of December 2025, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) conducted what was described as its most elaborate military manoeuvres under the codename “Justice Mission 2025”.

The exercises lasted several days and involved the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) surrounding Taiwan from multiple directions. Chinese naval destroyers, fighter aircraft and long-range missile systems were deployed from the northern, southern and eastern approaches.

Unlike some earlier exercises, which were primarily intended to demonstrate military strength and create psychological pressure, “Justice Mission 2025” was widely interpreted as a rehearsal for a potential naval blockade. Chinese forces practised scenarios aimed at isolating Taiwan’s major ports, including Keelung and Kaohsiung, while missile launches were conducted within 12 nautical miles of Taiwan’s territorial baseline.

The exercises followed a record $11.1 billion US arms sale to Taiwan, which Beijing condemned as an “irritational provocation”. The timing underscored the increasingly interconnected nature of military developments on both sides of the Strait: Chinese military pressure is partly designed to deter Taiwan and outside powers, while American arms transfers are intended to strengthen Taiwan’s ability to defend itself.

Military activity around Taiwan has become increasingly frequent. Chinese aircraft and naval vessels are operating closer to Taiwan with greater regularity than in the past. While such operations can serve as demonstrations of deterrence, their increasing frequency also reduces the margin for error.

The closer military forces operate to one another, the greater the possibility of miscalculation, miscommunication or an accidental encounter. A confrontation that begins unintentionally could escalate rapidly because of the involvement of major military powers and the political importance attached to Taiwan.

The 2025 exercises can also be understood as a form of counter-intervention rehearsal. Beijing’s military planning is not directed exclusively at Taiwan. It also seeks to deter or complicate potential intervention by third parties, particularly the United States and Japan, should a cross-Strait conflict occur.

This makes the Taiwan Strait part of a broader strategic contest over the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

The strategic importance of Taiwan extends far beyond its geographical size. The Taiwan Strait lies near major commercial and shipping routes connecting the economies of East Asia. Any prolonged conflict or blockade could disrupt maritime transportation and international supply chains.

Taiwan’s position in the global semiconductor industry adds another layer of significance. The island is among the world’s leading producers of advanced semiconductors, which are indispensable to smartphones, computers, automobiles, telecommunications systems and military equipment. A serious crisis in the Taiwan Strait could therefore generate economic and technological consequences far beyond Asia.

For this reason, instability around Taiwan is not simply a regional security concern. A blockade, military confrontation or prolonged disruption of shipping could affect international businesses, financial markets, manufacturing networks and technology supply chains.

China regards Taiwan as part of its territory and considers reunification a core national objective. Beijing’s position is rooted in its interpretation of the “One China” principle, while Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly linked national reunification to the broader objective of achieving the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”.

Consequently, Beijing strongly opposes any move towards formal Taiwanese independence. At the same time, China has generally relied on a combination of pressure and coercion rather than immediately pursuing full-scale military invasion.

Its approach includes diplomatic isolation, economic influence and military pressure. The 2025 exercises can therefore be viewed as part of a broader strategy designed to send a powerful political and military message while stopping short of an actual war.

China has also increasingly relied on what analysts describe as “gray-zone tactics”. These involve sustained activities below the threshold of conventional warfare. Military patrols, air operations and naval deployments near Taiwan can place continuous pressure on Taipei, test its responses, demonstrate Chinese capabilities and gradually alter the strategic environment without crossing the threshold of open conflict.

Such tactics also have a psychological dimension. By repeatedly operating around Taiwan, Beijing can seek to demonstrate that it possesses the capability to impose pressure or potentially restrict Taiwan’s access to the surrounding waters and airspace.

Taiwan’s strategic objectives are fundamentally different. Taipei’s principal concerns are the preservation of its political autonomy, democratic institutions, security and international participation.

A majority of Taiwan’s population favours maintaining the island’s existing status rather than pursuing reunification with China. At the same time, there is apprehension among some Taiwanese about formally declaring independence because such a step could trigger a military response from Beijing.

Under President Lai Ching-te, Taiwan has sought to strengthen its defence preparedness and improve its ability to withstand military pressure. The government has focused on modern weapons, missile capabilities, cybersecurity and other advanced defence technologies.

Taiwan’s approach is largely based on deterrence. The objective is not necessarily to match China’s military strength system for system, but to ensure that any attempt to attack or invade Taiwan would be sufficiently difficult and costly to discourage Beijing from taking such a step.

Taiwan has also strengthened relations with countries such as the United States and Japan. These relationships provide Taipei with important political and security support as it attempts to balance China’s growing military capabilities.

The United States occupies a particularly important position in the Taiwan question. Washington officially maintains its “One China” policy, while simultaneously supporting Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. This framework allows the United States to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons and other forms of assistance.

For Washington, Taiwan is important not only because of its own security but also because of the broader balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. American policymakers have concerns that Chinese control of Taiwan could significantly expand Beijing’s strategic influence in Asia and weaken the position of US allies and partners in the region.

Taiwan’s importance to advanced semiconductor production further increases its strategic value for the United States. Modern economies and military systems depend heavily on sophisticated chips, making Taiwan’s semiconductor industry a critical component of global technological supply chains.

Freedom of navigation is another major American concern. The Taiwan Strait is an important route for international maritime commerce, and Washington has an interest in ensuring that no single power can dominate or restrict access to these waterways. A conflict or blockade could severely disrupt global trade.

The United States has therefore expanded military cooperation with regional partners while continuing arms supplies to Taiwan. Yet Washington also faces the challenge of avoiding a direct war with China, a conflict that could have devastating regional and global consequences.

This dilemma is reflected in America’s policy of “strategic ambiguity”. Washington provides Taiwan with political and military support without explicitly guaranteeing that US forces would directly intervene if China launched an attack. The policy is intended to deter Beijing while also discouraging Taipei from taking steps that could trigger a conflict.

The growing military activity around Taiwan carries several serious consequences.

First, the increased presence of Chinese, Taiwanese and American military forces raises the possibility of accidental clashes. A collision, miscalculation or misunderstanding could create a crisis that becomes difficult to control.

Second, the Taiwan question is contributing to a broader regional arms competition. Countries including Japan, Australia and the Philippines have expanded military cooperation and increased defence spending amid concerns about China’s growing capabilities. The result is an increasingly militarised Indo-Pacific in which states are simultaneously strengthening deterrence and becoming more sensitive to potential threats.

Third, the economic consequences of a conflict could be severe. Taiwan’s central role in semiconductor manufacturing means that instability could affect industries around the world. Disruption would not be limited to Asian economies but could extend to global technology, manufacturing and trade networks.

The danger, however, is accompanied by an important restraint: none of the major parties appears to have an obvious interest in a full-scale war.

China may prefer coercion and military pressure because an invasion would carry enormous economic, political and military costs. Taiwan wants to strengthen its ability to defend itself but has little incentive to formally declare independence if doing so could provoke a Chinese military response. The United States wants to preserve the regional balance of power and support Taiwan without entering into a potentially catastrophic war with China.

The result is a delicate balance between deterrence and escalation.

The existing approach has helped prevent an all-out war, but it has not eliminated the underlying sources of tension. China’s expanding military activities contribute to insecurity, while greater American involvement increases Beijing’s concerns about external intervention. Consequently, the strategic environment remains tense and unpredictable.

A more effective approach would require greater emphasis on crisis management and communication.

Regular diplomatic dialogue among Beijing, Taipei and Washington could help reduce misunderstandings and provide channels for addressing disputes before they become military crises. Military hotlines and direct communication between military officials could be particularly important in preventing an accidental encounter from escalating into a wider confrontation.

Regional and international organisations, as well as neighbouring countries, could also contribute by encouraging dialogue and supporting mechanisms designed to reduce tensions. At the same time, all sides would benefit from avoiding unnecessary provocations, including aggressive political rhetoric and military demonstrations that could be interpreted as preparation for conflict.

Deterrence remains an important element of Taiwan’s security strategy. One approach is to make a potential attack extremely difficult and costly without relying exclusively on large and expensive weapons platforms.

Taiwan has increasingly been encouraged to develop a broader range of relatively inexpensive and mobile defensive capabilities, including drones and missile systems. A dispersed defence structure could make it more difficult for an adversary to achieve a rapid victory and increase the costs associated with any invasion attempt.

At the same time, reducing the global economy’s dependence on Taiwan for semiconductor production could help limit the economic consequences of a potential crisis.

Because Taiwan produces a substantial share of the world’s advanced computer chips, any serious disruption could create major technological and economic problems. Countries are consequently expanding semiconductor manufacturing in other parts of the world. Such diversification cannot eliminate the consequences of a Taiwan Strait crisis, but it can reduce the vulnerability of global supply chains.

The “Justice Mission 2025” exercises demonstrated how rapidly the Taiwan Strait is becoming a more dangerous arena for strategic competition. The drills were significant not simply because of the military capabilities displayed by China, but because they illustrated how deterrence, coercion and preparations for potential conflict are increasingly overlapping.

China, Taiwan and the United States have fundamentally different interests in the Taiwan question. Beijing seeks reunification and opposes Taiwanese independence; Taiwan seeks to preserve its autonomy, democratic system and security; and Washington seeks to support Taiwan while maintaining the regional balance of power and avoiding direct conflict with China.

These competing objectives make the Taiwan Strait exceptionally difficult to manage. Existing deterrence mechanisms may continue to prevent a full-scale conflict, but increasingly frequent military encounters also create new opportunities for miscalculation.

The central challenge, therefore, is to maintain deterrence without allowing deterrence itself to become a pathway towards escalation. Military preparedness may discourage aggression, but it cannot substitute for communication and diplomacy.

Long-term stability in the Taiwan Strait will ultimately depend on whether the competing powers can establish mechanisms that manage crises, reduce misunderstandings and discourage actions that could trigger an uncontrollable confrontation.

The objective should not merely be to prepare for the next crisis, but to ensure that the next crisis does not become a war.

The writer is an MPhil scholar in International Relations. Her research interests include great power politics, South Asian security, and Pakistan’s foreign policy.

The article is the writer’s opinion, it may or may not adhere to the organization’s editorial policy.