The Wars Behind the Wars

Saleem Raza

Bradford: There is a question becoming increasingly difficult to ignore: are today’s wars really being fought only over territory, security and political power, or are they also reshaping the architecture of the global energy economy?

At first glance, the confrontation between Iran and the United States, the Saudi-Houthi struggle around the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, and Ukraine’s attacks on Russian energy infrastructure appear to be separate conflicts.

Economically, however, they are becoming increasingly connected.

The link is energy.

Oil and gas. Tankers and pipelines. Refineries and ports. Insurance and shipping. Strategic reserves and financial markets. The ability to move energy safely and continuously is becoming almost as important as the ability to produce it.

This matters because modern energy warfare does not necessarily require an oil field to be destroyed. A tanker does not have to sink. A refinery does not have to be permanently demolished. A shipping route does not have to close completely.

Sometimes all that is required is uncertainty.

A ship becomes more expensive to insure. A carrier decides to avoid a dangerous maritime corridor. A refinery operates below capacity. A government restricts exports. Traders begin to price in the possibility of a future disruption.

The result can be higher energy prices thousands of kilometres from the battlefield.

That is the new energy battlefield.

The $100 Barrel

Oil markets do not wait for physical destruction before reacting.

In July 2026, following Houthi attacks on Saudi-linked shipping, Brent crude briefly moved above $100 a barrel. S&P Global reported that Brent rose by roughly 7% on July 23 as concerns intensified that both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb could become major constraints on energy flows. The Washington Post likewise reported that Brent reached $100 as attacks on Saudi tankers heightened fears about global supply.

The significance lies not simply in the price itself, but in what caused it.

The market was responding to risk.

The economic weapon was not necessarily the missile. There was uncertainty over what the next missile might do.

That distinction is crucial.

Who Benefits From Red Sea Instability?

A widely circulated argument on social media goes much further. It suggests that Washington secretly wants oil prices to remain high and therefore deliberately tolerates Houthi attacks because every disruption in the Red Sea increases the value of American oil.

It is an attractive theory because there is a genuine economic relationship behind it.

The United States has become the world’s leading crude producer. In 2025, U.S. crude production reached another record, with the Permian Basin alone producing around 6.6 million barrels per day.

The Dallas Federal Reserve’s survey of oil executives placed 2025 breakeven prices at roughly 61–62 a barrel in the two largest Permian basins. By 2026, higher prices were supporting additional Permian production, with the EIA reporting average WTI prices of $84 a barrel through August.

The relationship is therefore straightforward:

Higher oil prices can improve the economics of US oil production.

But the next step in the argument does not automatically follow.

Economic benefit is not proof of deliberate policy.

There is no evidence presented here that establishes that Washington deliberately permits Houthi attacks in order to keep oil prices high.

Indeed, the historical record points in the opposite direction. In 2025, the United States launched extensive military strikes against the Houthis in an effort to end attacks on shipping. A subsequent Oman-brokered arrangement brought that U.S. campaign to an end.

The simple proposition that “America wants the Houthis to keep attacking” therefore fails to explain the full picture.

Yet another, more subtle point remains.

A crisis can create beneficiaries without those beneficiaries having created the crisis.

That distinction is essential.

The Missile Is Only the Beginning

The real economic cost of a missile may be paid not by the ship it strikes, but by the insurance market.

When a vessel enters a dangerous maritime corridor, its operator may face higher war-risk insurance, higher freight costs, longer voyages, increased fuel consumption, delays, crew-safety risks and uncertainty over whether cargo will arrive on schedule.

In September 2026, Reuters reported that war-risk insurance premiums for Saudi-linked tankers at Yanbu had risen to around 3% of vessel value, compared with approximately 0.2–0.3% for vessels not linked to Saudi Arabia. Premiums near Yemeni waters could reach about 7%.

These figures reveal how geopolitical instability moves through the financial system.

A missile does not need to destroy a tanker to change the economics of shipping it.

And when ships avoid the Red Sea, the consequences extend far beyond the immediate conflict.

Red Sea disruption affects Suez Canal traffic. Suez affects Egyptian revenue. Changes in shipping routes affect European trade and Asian supply chains. Longer voyages raise freight and fuel costs. Those costs can eventually reach consumers.

The chain looks something like this:

Conflict → risk → insurance → shipping → supply chains → prices.

That is why Bab el-Mandeb matters far beyond Yemen.

Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Dilemma

Saudi Arabia adds another layer to the story because it possesses something most oil-producing countries would envy: alternative export routes.

The East-West Pipeline allows Saudi oil to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and reach the Red Sea.

That is strategically valuable when Hormuz is threatened.

But it creates another vulnerability.

The Red Sea itself can become a pressure point.

In 2026, attacks and instability around the Red Sea transformed an alternative Saudi export route into another strategic risk. S&P Global reported that Saudi Arabia increasingly relied on Yanbu exports to bypass Hormuz, with around 3.9 million barrels per day loaded from Yanbu during the second quarter of 2026.

The paradox is striking.

A route designed to reduce one vulnerability can become the target of another.

In an interconnected energy system, there may be no completely secure alternative—only different forms of risk.

The Venezuelan Complication

The original argument also invokes Venezuelan heavy crude and CITGO.

Here again, the reality is more complicated than the social-media version suggests.

CITGO is a US-based refining company ultimately connected to Venezuela through PDVSA’s ownership structure. CITGO states that PDV Holding, owned by Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA, is the indirect sole stockholder of CITGO Petroleum.

But the proposition that Washington could simply engineer a Red Sea crisis and then force Europe to buy “American-Venezuelan oil” at a predetermined price does not fit the realities of the global oil market.

Oil is a global commodity.

But not every barrel is interchangeable.

Refinery configurations matter. Crude grades matter. Pipeline infrastructure matters. Shipping costs matter. Sanctions matter. European buyers also have multiple sources of supply.

The Venezuelan connection is therefore important, but not because it proves a secret American energy conspiracy.

Its real significance lies elsewhere.

In an increasingly fragmented energy market, the strategic value of a barrel depends not only on where it comes from, but also on who can refine it, transport it and legally trade it.

The War Has Entered the Refinery

The Russia–Ukraine war reveals the same transformation from another direction.

Ukraine has increasingly targeted Russian oil infrastructure with long-range drones. The objective is not simply to destroy military equipment or battlefield positions. It is increasingly to disrupt the machinery that converts crude oil into the fuels modern economies depend upon.

The International Energy Agency reported in September 2026 that Russian refinery throughput had fallen to approximately 3.8 million barrels per day in June—around 30% below the previous year and the lowest level in more than two decades.

The IEA also recorded 204 confirmed strikes against 28 major Russian refineries as of September 15, with attacks occurring roughly once every three days during the first eight months of 2026.

The consequences are substantial.

Russia has introduced restrictions on gasoline, jet-fuel and diesel exports, while Russian diesel production has fallen sharply.

This reveals something fundamental about modern energy warfare.

Ukraine does not have to destroy Russia’s oil fields to affect the energy market.

It can attack the machinery that turns crude into usable fuel.

And that distinction is increasingly important.

The Refinery May Matter More Than the Oil Well

The world often speaks about “oil supply” as though crude oil and refined fuel were interchangeable.

They are not.

A barrel of crude is not the same thing as a barrel of diesel.

A country can possess enormous oil reserves and still experience shortages of refined products.

This is why refinery capacity has become a strategic asset in its own right.

The IEA describes global refined-product markets, particularly diesel, as especially tight. It reports that nearly 3 million barrels per day of refining capacity in the Gulf region has been shut because of attacks and disrupted export routes, while Ukrainian attacks have significantly reduced Russian refinery operations and product exports.

The geopolitical calculation therefore changes.

The critical question is no longer simply:

Who has the oil?

It is also:

Who can turn that oil into fuel, move it across borders and deliver it reliably to consumers?

The new energy chain is:

Crude → refinery → diesel → shipping → insurance → consumer.

Control over that chain can be as strategically important as control over the oil field itself.

America’s Unusual Position

This is where the United States occupies an unusual position in the global system.

America is not simply a major energy consumer.

It is simultaneously a major producer, refiner and exporter, while also possessing enormous financial, technological, military and shipping capabilities.

That combination matters.

When Russian and Middle Eastern refining capacity is disrupted, American refiners can become important marginal suppliers.

Reuters reported in September that U.S. diesel exports had risen by more than 20% from 2025 levels to around 1.3 million barrels per day amid disruptions to Middle Eastern and Russian refining.

But even here, the picture refuses to fit a simple “America wins” narrative.

The same American energy system that can benefit from export opportunities can also suffer from domestic shortages.

The same Reuters analysis reported record U.S. retail diesel prices and very low domestic inventories.

In other words, the consequences of geopolitical disruption can be distributed unevenly within the same country.

Some producers and refiners may benefit.

Consumers may simultaneously pay more.

There is no single American outcome.

Russia Is Reconfiguring, Not Disappearing

The opposite simplification is equally misleading.

Russia has suffered major pressure from sanctions, reduced European energy trade and attacks on its refining system. But it remains a major energy producer and is developing alternative export infrastructure.

In September 2026, Russia began commercial exports from the Vostok Oil project in the Arctic, with plans to expand production substantially over the coming years.

Meanwhile, Russian oil continues to reach global markets through changing trade patterns.

The result is not the disappearance of Russian energy.

It is the reconfiguration of Russian energy geography.

Europe has reduced its dependence on Russian energy. Russia has increased its orientation toward alternative buyers and routes. China, India, Türkiye and others have become increasingly important.

The map of global energy trade is being redrawn.

Iran and the Chokepoint That Cannot Easily Be Replaced

Then there is Iran.

Iran sits beside perhaps the most consequential geographical pressure point in the entire system: the Strait of Hormuz.

When Hormuz is threatened, the consequences extend far beyond the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE can attempt to reroute exports. The United States can release strategic petroleum reserves. Europe can search for alternative supplies. Asian buyers can change purchasing patterns.

But none of these measures can immediately reproduce the logistical significance of Hormuz.

That is why the Iran–USA confrontation cannot be understood simply as another regional conflict.

It is also a confrontation over energy geography.

Three Wars, One Energy System

Viewed separately, the conflicts appear distinct.

Viewed through energy, the connections become clearer.

The Iran–USA confrontation places the Strait of Hormuz and global crude and LNG flows at the centre of the risk.

The Saudi–Houthi conflict places Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea at the centre, with consequences for shipping, insurance and alternative export routes.

The Russia–Ukraine war increasingly targets refineries and energy infrastructure, affecting diesel, gasoline and other refined products.

Different wars.

One increasingly interconnected energy system.

And when these pressures intersect, the result is not necessarily a simple shortage of crude.

It can be something more complicated:

a shortage of secure, affordable and efficiently transportable energy.

The Myth of the “30% Chaos” Formula

This brings us to the viral theory that there is supposedly a perfect level of instability—around 30%—at which oil prices remain high enough to benefit American producers without becoming high enough to destabilise the global economy.

It is an attractive theory.

But it is not an established intelligence doctrine.

No credible evidence has been presented here for a formal US policy called a “30% chaos rule.”

More importantly, markets do not behave like thermostats.

Rising prices can benefit producers, but they can also destroy demand, encourage new production, accelerate alternative-energy investment, raise inflation, damage consumers, force central banks to tighten monetary policy, increase recession risks and encourage rival producers.

The same shock that benefits one part of an economy can damage another.

There is therefore no obvious fixed “golden price” at which geopolitical instability becomes economically optimal.

The More Important Question

The deeper question is not simply whether America secretly wants war.

It is this:

How does a great power behave when its economic system can simultaneously suffer from and benefit from the same geopolitical shock?

That is a far more revealing question.

The United States can have strategic reasons to suppress a conflict while some American companies benefit from its economic consequences.

Saudi Arabia can suffer from attacks while alternative energy routes become more strategically valuable.

Russia can lose refinery capacity while higher global oil prices partly cushion its crude-export revenues.

Ukraine can damage Russian energy infrastructure while simultaneously contributing to tighter European fuel markets.

Europe can impose sanctions on Russian energy while becoming more dependent on other external suppliers.

Iran can threaten global energy routes while simultaneously risking damage to its own economic position.

There is no single winner.

There are different beneficiaries—and different victims—at different points in the chain.

The New Geopolitical Commodity

Perhaps the biggest lesson is that the world’s most valuable commodity may increasingly be neither oil nor gas alone.

It may be reliable energy movement.

The ability to move energy safely, cheaply, continuously, legally and insurably requires pipelines, tankers, ports, refineries, insurance markets, shipping corridors, financial systems, satellite communications, military protection and diplomatic agreements.

Disrupt any one of these and the price of the entire system can move.

That is why a drone over a refinery, a missile near a tanker, a sanction affecting an insurer or a closure of a maritime passage can have consequences thousands of miles away.

The battlefield has expanded.

It now includes the refinery, the tanker, the pipeline, the insurance market, the strategic reserve, the futures market—and ultimately, the consumer’s fuel bill.

Why Pakistan Should Be Watching

For Pakistan, this is not merely a distant geopolitical drama.

Pakistan imports a substantial proportion of the energy it consumes. That makes it particularly exposed to disruptions in the international energy system.

A conflict in the Middle East can push up crude prices.

Red Sea instability can increase freight and insurance costs.

Disruption around Hormuz can threaten Gulf supplies.

Russian refinery disruption can tighten global diesel markets.

European energy shortages can increase competition for alternative supplies.

The consequences can eventually appear in petrol prices, diesel prices, electricity costs, transport costs, food prices and inflation.

The strategic question for Pakistan, therefore, is not simply which country wins the next war.

It is:

How resilient is Pakistan’s energy system when several global supply corridors are simultaneously under pressure?

That is the more practical national question.

Beyond the Headlines

The viral claim that America deliberately allows Houthi attacks because every missile makes Texas richer is too simplistic to explain the evidence.

But dismissing the entire argument simply because the conspiracy claim cannot be proven would also miss the larger transformation taking place.

There is a real geopolitical economy in which:

war → risk → insurance → shipping → refining → supply → price → investment → political power.

The wars in Iran, Yemen and Ukraine are increasingly connected through this chain.

The battlefield is no longer confined to the places where missiles land.

It includes the refinery, the tanker, the pipeline, the insurance market, the strategic reserve, the futures market and the consumer’s fuel bill.

Perhaps the most important geopolitical question of the next decade will therefore not be:

Who controls the oil?

It may instead be:

Who controls the pathways through which the world can safely turn energy into economic activity?

That is a very different contest.

The wars may be fought with missiles and drones.

But increasingly, their consequences are being measured in barrels, barrels per day, insurance premiums, refinery capacity—and the price paid at the pump.

The author, a Pakistan-born creative based in Bradford, UK, is a versatile talent celebrated as a designer, artist, and poet. They hold a postgraduate degree in fashion design from London, showcasing their expertise in both artistic and academic pursuits.

The article is the writer’s opinion, it may or may not adhere to the organization’s editorial policy.