Makkah Pact: What Has India Worried?
Ishtiaq Ahmed
Bradford: The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye marks a potentially important development in the security landscape stretching from the Gulf to South Asia.
Signed in Makkah on August 7, the pact commits the three countries to collective defence: an armed attack on one is to be treated as an attack on all. Turkish officials have likened the principle to NATO’s Article 5, while stressing that the agreement is defensive and not directed against Iran or any other state.
It would be premature to call this an “Islamic NATO”. The three countries have not suddenly become a unified military bloc. Yet the agreement could gradually create a wider security network, with consequences for India.
The pact reflects growing uncertainty about the existing Middle Eastern security architecture. Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability to missile and drone attacks, combined with changing perceptions of the United States as the ultimate guarantor of Gulf security, has encouraged regional states to diversify their partnerships.
Saudi Arabia can simultaneously maintain ties with Iran, China and the United States while deepening military cooperation with Pakistan and Türkiye. The Makkah Pact is therefore better understood as a hedge against uncertainty rather than a rejection of America.
For Pakistan, the agreement offers more than symbolism. Saudi Arabia brings financial strength, energy influence and diplomatic reach; Türkiye contributes military and defence-industrial capabilities; and Pakistan brings substantial conventional forces, combat experience and the strategic significance of being a nuclear-armed state.
The arrangement also strengthens Pakistan’s position as a security actor with influence extending beyond South Asia. Pakistan’s growing reach is a concern for India.
India’s concern is not that Saudi Arabia or Türkiye will automatically support Pakistan in a conflict. There is no evidence that the pact requires them to do so. The deeper concern is that Pakistan could gain greater strategic depth and diplomatic backing.
Any future India-Pakistan crisis could therefore involve more capitals, greater mediation and additional political pressure. The diplomatic battlefield surrounding a military crisis could become almost as important as the military one.
The China factor adds another layer. Pakistan is a longstanding Chinese strategic partner, Saudi Arabia has substantially expanded its relationship with Beijing, and Türkiye continues to seek strategic room between major powers.
The pact is not evidence of a Chinese project, but it reflects a broader trend: states are diversifying their security partnerships rather than relying on a single external power. For India, this raises the possibility of facing a network of overlapping partnerships rather than a conventional alliance.
The Gulf is vital to India’s energy security, trade and investment, maritime interests, and the welfare of millions of Indians.
New Delhi has therefore carefully balanced its relationships with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran, Israel, the United States and other key regional actors. The emergence of new security arrangements could make this balancing act considerably more difficult, particularly if additional countries join the pact.
If Egypt were to enter the agreement, for example, it could place further pressure on India to reassess aspects of its close relationship with Israel.
A broader security framework bringing together a larger number of Muslim-majority states, particularly one in which Pakistan assumes a more influential role, could also create new diplomatic challenges for New Delhi.
India’s domestic record on the treatment of Muslims and other minorities could come under greater international scrutiny within such a framework. Issues that New Delhi has so far sought to contain within the context of its domestic affairs could receive greater attention through a multilateral forum in which Pakistan has an enhanced position.
Similarly, the issue of Indian-occupied Kashmir, and what Pakistan characterises as India’s forced annexation of the territory, could receive renewed international attention.
Consequently, the expansion of such a security framework could narrow India’s diplomatic room for manoeuvre.
New Delhi may find it increasingly difficult to prevent contentious issues such as Kashmir and minority rights from entering broader regional and international discussions, particularly if Pakistan succeeds in securing a more prominent role within the emerging regional order.
Iran presents another complication. While the pact could be viewed as a Sunni coalition against Tehran, that interpretation is too simplistic.
Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan all have reasons to avoid an overt anti-Iranian alignment, and the signatories have explicitly described the pact as defensive. Nevertheless, Iran will have to assess whether to accommodate the arrangement, counterbalance it or improve relations with its members.
The agreement should also not be taken as proof that American influence in the Middle East is collapsing. The United States remains the region’s most powerful external military actor.
What is changing is the perception that no single external power can be relied upon in every contingency. Regional states are consequently building their own insurance policies.
For India, the appropriate response is therefore neither alarm nor alignment with one camp. New Delhi should strengthen its relationships across the Gulf while preserving ties with the United States, Russia, Iran and other major partners.
At the same time, in an increasingly fragmented strategic environment, India’s ability to maintain multiple relationships and preserve strategic autonomy is becoming more valuable, not less.
