Regional Strategy Shifts via Minilateralism

Basit Ali

Lahore: Since the advent of the Indo-Pacific construct, minilateralism refers to the genesis of alliances, corridor politics, and strategic goals pertaining to particular fears that include a small number of nations to establish collaboration among regional powers.

As geopolitical dynamics changed, the US-led rules-based system declined, China and other middle powers rose to prominence, and evolved as the first realistic solution to a number of regional problems.

How did minilateralism evolve as a key feature for shaping alliances in Indo-Pacific construct?

The term “minilateralism” was first used in international politics in 1992 by Miles Kohler, an international political economist. The Five Powers Defense Arrangement (FDPA) for regional cooperation is one example of such a mechanism.

Since the start of the Cold War, there has been a bipolar global order, followed by US unilateralism in the years following 9/11 and the current emergence of China and other middle powers to independently act in regional affairs.

Liberalism promotes a free world and democracy, and multilateralism is a framework in which several governments can cooperate on certain issues. In the past, Southeast Asian nations used the ASEAN platform in tandem with the US to promote collaboration and deal with shared issues during the Cold War.

Due to China’s rise in launching the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which encompasses more than sixty nations through the Silk Road and the Indian Ocean, this region is vulnerable to the strategic dominance of its rivals.

India is benefiting from trilateral alliances; Pakistan is also a responsible regional voice, outperforming its archrival minilateral approach on matters of regional security and economic cooperation.

The balance of power in South Asia in general and the Indian Ocean in particular is becoming more fragile by the growing formation of alliances on trilateral platforms and regional economic corridors.

Power politics in Indian Ocean

It is no secret that realists have begun to believe that ASEAN and other multilateral platforms are merely examples of failure, and that the multilateral order has encountered numerous difficulties. The emergence of China and other middle powers that do not fit the definition of great powers has led regional states to take advantage of their strategic value and enormous influence.

Among the minilateral agreements that states choose to develop policy alternatives and address overlapping interests, QUAD is the most contentious. India has emerged as the leading nation involved in over seven Indo-Pacific initiatives.

Indian participation with other middle powers in several trilateral platforms, including QUAD, AUKUS, IMEC, I2U2, and so on, has relative strength in its regional policy postures. India’s issue-specific partnerships led it towards strategic autonomy and multi-alignment to get rid of the US-led alliance system.

Pakistan faces challenges from the growing Indian role in the Indo-Pacific construct, and it has aligned its interests with China through CPEC. As the geopolitical rivalry between the US and China intensifies, India is employing a buck-passing strategy with other middle powers to counter the growing Chinese role.

States are forced to find alternatives due to the comparatively diminishing influence of international organizations and multilateral platforms, including the United Nations, World Trade Organization, ASEAN, NATO, BRICS, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

For regional collaboration, Pakistan and other South Asian nations are buck-passing to China and Middle Eastern middle powers. The Kashmir dispute remains unsolved, the Indus Water Treaty is simmering, and political unrest, the weapons race, and climate change further force both India and Pakistan to enter into minilateral agreements to work on shared interests.

India engages simultaneously with China, Russia, and the QUAD to mitigate perceptions of alignment with an explicitly anti-Western bloc. Despite its tense border dispute with China, India remains the only QUAD member that refrains from openly projecting the grouping as a formal alliance.

Similarly, Pakistan seeks to enhance its strategic relevance by strengthening cooperation with Central Asia, China, Türkiye, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Russia. To reinforce its security and defence posture, Pakistan is increasingly adopting minilateral approaches with friendly Indian Ocean states, particularly China, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.

The Geopolitics of Corridors

Clarification of strategic and operational level goals is necessary while discussing multilateralism in the Indian Ocean. The US National Security Strategy 2025 will embrace partners in the Pacific and Indian Oceans while maintaining its role in containing China in the Indo-Pacific.

The United States has pursued ambitious objectives in the Indian Ocean to uphold its rules-based order through initiatives such as the 2017 Indo-Pacific Strategy, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), and the proposed Lobito Corridor extension.

However, intensifying US–China strategic competition, escalating tensions in the Middle East, particularly the Israel–Iran conflict, and Pakistan’s exclusion from the IMEC pose significant challenges to effective regional cooperation

Another significant geopolitical initiative is the I2U2 grouping comprising India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States—which seeks to promote regional cooperation in technology, food security, energy, transportation, and water, while also serving as a counterbalance to China’s growing influence.

Pakistan’s deeper alignment with China through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) remains a viable option for enhancing maritime security, despite the economic and security challenges it poses for both partners.

To offset India’s expanding regional footprint which constrains Islamabad’s maritime security interests, blue economy ambitions, and strategic influence Pakistan is actively recalibrating its policies to enhance its strategic relevance along the Indian Ocean littoral, while also exploring closer engagement with platforms such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and partners like Russia.

China is also actively pursuing multilateral arrangements such as the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation (LMC), which includes Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam, to advance cooperation on food security, public health, and safety standards in the Mekong subregion.

Within the broader Belt and Road Initiative, the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIMEC) and the China–Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CIPEC) are critical frameworks for enhancing regional connectivity and security.

As major and middle powers compete for relative advantages in the increasingly contested Indian Ocean region, minilateralism has emerged as a salient strategy for states such as India, Pakistan, China, the United States, and other middle powers to adapt to evolving security imperatives and economic interests

Way Forward

Minilateralism appears to be a pragmatic strategy for countries such as the United States, China, India, Pakistan, and other middle powers, particularly as great-power rivalries intensify and multilateral institutions face relative limitations.

As evidenced during the COVID-19 pandemic, flexible, issue-specific approaches within minilateral frameworks often allow India and Pakistan to address challenges related to maritime security, climate change, trade route protection, and disaster response.

To maintain a focused mandate and avoid conflicts of interest, it is essential to combine inclusive regional strategies with strong bilateral partnerships.

In today’s geopolitical landscape, the Indian Ocean remains one of the most contested regions. India is pursuing engagement with middle powers and spearheading liaison initiatives, while Pakistan seeks to maintain strategic relevance.

Functional cooperation that avoids zero-sum competition can be particularly effective within minilateral frameworks. Therefore, nations should emphasize regional connectivity, security, and economic resilience over overt power balancing. Institutionalized communication and confidence-building measures can help prevent exclusionary bloc politics, reduce misunderstandings, and enhance regional stability.

President Trump’s use of limited military interventions, such as strikes in Venezuela and heightened pressure on Iran, combined with the United States’ withdrawal from or disengagement with several multilateral institutions, has disrupted the post‑Cold War global order and weakened confidence in longstanding international frameworks.

Many analysts describe aspects of this approach as a contemporary “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, where the US prioritizes security in the Western Hemisphere and asserts unilateral measures to protect perceived national interests, even at the expense of international norms and multilateral cooperation.

This shift is reflected in the 2025 US National Security Strategy, which omits meaningful engagement with South Asia and relegates Pakistan to a peripheral role compared with the United States’ focus on the Western Hemisphere and great‑power competition in East Asia.

Although Pakistan and other South Asian nations can use minilateralism to complement existing multilateral institutions, it has also become a central element of India’s foreign policy. Within the Indo-Pacific framework, Pakistan would need to enhance maritime domain awareness, crisis response capabilities, and humanitarian assistance.

Effective coordination through minilateral platforms such as SAARC excluding India and IORA for diplomatic engagement and addressing shared security challenges will require pragmatism and careful assessment.

To strengthen regional balance, reduce tensions, and promote long-term security, minilateral mechanisms must offer practical and actionable solutions to emerging challenges.

Basit Ali is a Research Associate, Maritime Centre of Excellence, PNWC.

The article is the writer’s opinion, it may or may not adhere to the organization’s editorial policy.

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