Iran’s Bazaar Strikes Signal Crisis—but Not Yet Revolution

News Desk 

On Dec. 28, shopkeepers in Tehran’s Grand Bazaar did something that has historically rattled Iran’s rulers: they refused to open their doors.

The strike was a protest against runaway inflation, the collapse of the national currency and an economy that many Iranians say has become unlivable. For centuries, the bazaar has been more than a marketplace—it has been a political power center. When its merchants close shop, it often signals not just economic distress but political rupture.

Within days, protests spread across all of Iran’s provinces, from neglected industrial towns to major cities. Authorities responded with familiar tools: internet shutdowns, mass arrests and lethal force. Human rights groups say hundreds have been killed and thousands detained.

As unrest continues, President Donald Trump has publicly weighed the possibility of military strikes against Iran, raising fears of regional escalation.

To many observers, the moment feels eerily reminiscent of the period before the 1979 revolution. But beneath the surface similarities lies a vastly different political reality—one that complicates predictions of imminent regime collapse.

An Economy Crushed From Above and Below

Iran’s economic free fall did not happen overnight. It is the cumulative result of eight years of US pressure that combined sweeping sanctions with covert operations, cyberattacks and military strikes. While intended to weaken Iran’s ruling establishment, these measures have devastated the economic security of ordinary Iranians.

The national currency, the rial, has lost roughly 90 percent of its value against the dollar in the past year. That collapse accelerated after US and Israeli military strikes last summer, which reignited fears of prolonged conflict and dashed hopes of recovery. Inflation has driven the price of food, medicine and housing beyond the reach of millions.

Oil revenues—long the backbone of Iran’s state finances—remain severely constrained by sanctions. At the same time, the government has offered no coherent economic strategy, instead compounding the crisis through mismanagement. The result is a perfect storm: capital flight, soaring prices and widespread despair.

Yet the pain has not been evenly distributed. Sanctions created lucrative opportunities for those with access to smuggling networks and state protection. Elites tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) emerged as the primary beneficiaries, controlling imports, currency exchanges and access to restricted goods. For many Iranians, sanctions did not weaken the state—it reshaped it into something more predatory.

Echoes of 1979—and Their Limits

Social media, satellite television and Western commentary increasingly portray Iran as standing on the brink of collapse. The imagery is seductive: mass protests, bazaar strikes and a US president openly threatening force.

But revolutions are not driven by anger alone. Iranians were angry for years before 1979. What made the revolution succeed was the alignment of three decisive power centers: the public, the clergy and the bazaar, reinforced by fractures within the military.

That alignment does not exist today.

The monarchy—overthrown nearly half a century ago—has little organic support inside Iran. Though exiled crown prince Reza Pahlavi maintains a visible online presence, his image has been amplified largely through foreign-backed misinformation campaigns, according to reporting by Haaretz. Even Washington appears unconvinced: President Trump has declined to meet Pahlavi, underscoring how marginal the monarchist option remains.

Tehran, meanwhile, dismisses all dissent as foreign-orchestrated, using that narrative to justify repression. But disinformation—from both sides—obscures the real question: where power actually resides in Iran today.

The Bazaar’s Diminished Leverage

The Grand Bazaar remains symbolically potent, but its material power has changed. Before 1979, bazaar merchants operated as an autonomous economic bloc. Their financial independence allowed them to fund strikes, sustain resistance and pressure the state.

Decades of Islamic Republic rule—and especially years of sanctions—have eroded that autonomy. As the IRGC expanded its economic reach, traditional merchants were forced into partnerships with state-linked networks or pushed aside entirely. Many now depend on the same power structure they are protesting.

Ali, a prominent textile merchant whose family operates multiple businesses in the Tehran bazaar, described the bind. Speaking on condition that his last name not be used, he said factories are shutting down and traders are desperate.

“We closed our shops because we can’t continue like this,” he said. “The government needs to fundamentally change how it manages the sanctions and the economy.”

But as protests intensified—and U.S. threats escalated—Ali grew uneasy. “This is getting out of our control,” he said.

The bazaar wants stability. Revolution threatens the very conditions merchants need to survive.

A Fragmented Clergy and a Loyal Military

Iran’s clerical establishment, once a unifying revolutionary force, is now deeply fragmented. Shia Islam’s decentralized structure has produced competing centers of authority, wealth and ideology. Some clerics advocate reform and social freedoms; others demand harsher repression. Many are primarily concerned with preserving their own foundations and financial interests.

There is no figure today with the unifying authority of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini—and no consensus within the clergy on what should replace the current system.

Most decisive of all is the military. Revolutions tend to succeed when security forces defect or refuse orders. In Iran, there is no evidence of such cracks. The IRGC is not only a military force but an economic empire and political actor with everything to lose from regime collapse. Reports from inside the country suggest security forces remain cohesive and willing to use force.

Change From Within, Not Collapse

Many Iranian activists understand these realities all too well. Political prisoners and civil society organizers have repeatedly warned that war or violent revolution would devastate their movements and entrench repression.

Instead, they point to gradual but significant victories. The “Woman, Life, Freedom” uprising of 2022, built through years of organizing and everyday resistance, forced what many see as the Islamic Republic’s largest concession since 1979: the effective collapse of mandatory hijab enforcement across much of the country.

It was not a dramatic overthrow—but it was transformative.

Change in Iran, history suggests, will be uneven, slow and contested. Without durable organization and institutional alignment, protest cycles risk burning out—or being exploited by foreign powers whose interests rarely align with those of ordinary Iranians.

Iranians have already lived through one revolution whose promises curdled into repression. They deserve more than their suffering being repackaged as a geopolitical talking point.

Real solidarity means patience, skepticism toward simplistic narratives and support for the unglamorous work of building sustainable movements. Revolution is not a single moment. It is a long, uncertain process—one that cannot be willed into existence from abroad. The report has been published on Time Website. It is a rephrased version of the report.